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IAN WEINSTEIN*

The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur:
United States v. Booker and the
Reassertion of Judicial Limits on
Legislative Power to Define Crimes

S ince the end of World War II, our constitutional law of criminal sentencing has veered from judicial sentencing
supremacy to legislative domination and back again. In 1949, the
United States Supreme Court gave us a paean to judicial sentencing discretion, Williams v. New York. 1 In the mid 1970s, the
Court began to develop a set of doctrines that abetted the construction of a legislative straitjacket on judicial sentencing power.
Turning rather suddenly after more than twenty years on the
road of legislative dominance, the Court cut those ties, freeing
judges to sentence as they may and rejecting the most important
set of legislative sentencing reforms of the last century in a set of
cases culminating with United States v. Booker. 2 Viewed as cases
regulating sentencing, it is hard to see a consistent logical thread
running through these cases. But ours is a criminal justice system
of fragmented power and indirect regulation, in which cases
about one thing may really be directed at quite another.
For example, we regulate the right to a jury trial not so much
to control the rare jury trial, but more to influence the balance of
forces that will determine the negotiated pleas that will resolve
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I presented an earlier
draft of this paper at The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. I want to
thank Douglas Berman for his very helpful comments and my research assistant, Ms.
Marissa Kay, for her outstanding work on this paper.
1 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (affirming judicial imposition of a death sentence based on
evidence not presented to the jury and found by the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence).
2 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (excising the portions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
that made them binding to remedy a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial).
[3931
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most cases. 3 Although doctrine is an important constraint, our

criminal justice system retains the distinctive Anglo-American
preference for a high degree of indirect regulation of relatively
unconstrained individual official actors with competing spheres
of authority.4 The criminal law, which is arguably our most public exercise of legal power, retains a strong flavor of market-style

regulation. Public actors, such as prosecutors and judges, exercise public authority while retaining a significant degree of indi-

vidual discretion through doctrines of non-review 5 or review
3 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2467-68 (2004) (arguing that structural influences and psychological factors make the results of the current plea bargaining regime diverge dramatically
from those that would be achieved under a system in which trials predominated or
under a system of reformed plea bargaining); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand
Criminal Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2449-50 (2004) (arguing that as the criminal law expands it imposes fewer constraints on plea
bargains).
The Supreme Court has recognized that regulation of the Sixth Amendment right to
trial shifts the allocation of power among prosecutors, judges, and defendants,
changing the dynamics of plea bargaining. However, while the majority and dissenters agree that power shifts as the contours of the trial right change, they disagree on
who will gain power, who will lose power, and whether the shifts will help or harm
most defendants. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Of course, the details of the Sixth Amendment right also matter a great deal to those
defendants who choose to go to trial. The changes in sentencing law and procedure
discussed in this Article have also diminished the power of the juries in the cases
they decide. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The CriminalJury's ConstitutionalRole in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 34-35
(2003) (arguing that mandatory sentencing regimes have diminished the power of
the criminal jury).
4 Professor Daniel C. Richman has noted the tendency toward checks and balances even within the law enforcement establishment itself. "After all, the entire
American criminal justice system is characterized by an almost instinctive embrace
of fragmented authority, with the tensions between police and prosecutors, attorneys general and district attorneys usually seen as a virtue, rather than a vice."
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 807 (1999). Prof. Richman's Article asserts
that Congress exercises greater control over federal law enforcement through funding, oversight hearings, and other bureaucratic mechanisms than by limiting or tailoring substantive statutes, but that these controls only work in some areas of
enforcement and tend to be motivated less by policy preferences and more by the
desire to curb executive power. See Richman, supra.
5 Prosecutorial decisions about when or what to charge are virtually impossible to
review. The Supreme Court has noted that in the ordinary case, "so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file
or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (holding that although petitioner
was originally indicted for uttering a forged instrument, due process was not violated
when, during the course of plea negotiations, the prosecutor threatened to seek an
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under standards which insulate all but the most outrageous deci6
sions from reversal.
This Article argues that the modern sentencing procedure
cases make more sense when understood as the Supreme Court's
best effort to maintain balance among judges, prosecutors, and
legislators in the face of changing political and social conditions.
Although these cases regulate sentencing, they use sentencing as
a means to a larger end as they address narrower doctrinal questions. The cases in the line from Williams to Booker do not chart
a steady course or create optimal sentencing doctrines; rather,
they indirectly regulate the entire criminal justice system while
directly addressing sentencing.
The big issue behind these cases is the allocation of authority
in American criminal law among trial judges, appellate judges,
prosecutors, and legislators. In the late 1970s, at a time when the
sphere of legislative action in the criminal area seemed well-defined by practice, the Court curtailed judicial review of the legislature's power to define crimes and set punishments. It was safer
to give power to bodies that seemed disinclined to use it aggressively than to trust power with judges who appeared inclined to
use it. But by the late 1990s, legislators had clearly demonstrated
willingness to exercise their power over criminal justice issues at
the limits the Court had set for them. Legislatures also made it
clear that they had come to understand that their interests were
strongly tied to those of prosecutors, and both branches gained
power as judges lost it.' So, as the public clamor for severe penal
indictment under the Habitual Criminal Act if petitioner did not plead guilty to the
forged instrument charge); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-64
(1996) (holding that discovery on a selective prosecution claim is only required after
a threshold showing that others of a different race who were otherwise similarly
situated were not prosecuted). For the American historical background of
prosecutorial discretion, see Carolyn B. Ramsey, The DiscretionaryPower of "Public" Prosecutorsin Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002) (arguing that the shift from private to public prosecutors was driven by a desire to make
crime control more efficient, not to exercise greater public control or to make the
criminal law more accountable to law).
6 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' regime, for example, departure review under the abuse of discretion standard insulated trial judges in many circuits
from reversal, freeing them to push the boundaries of the law. See Ian Weinstein,
The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to Recognize
the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493
(1999) (finding that some of the circuits reversed virtually no district court departures under the abuse of discretion standard). Many question whether reasonableness review in the current regime will have any teeth.
7 Congress and many state legislatures have used their greater power to define
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laws began to abate a little, the Court began to push back in the
late 1990s. In an effort to rebalance the system, the Court reallocated power from the legislators and prosecutors to judges. It

bears noting that the current arrangements may be overturned by
Congress and that state legislatures may be affected by these

changes. It remains to be seen whether we are at, or will come
to, a period of stability in our sentencing law and practices.
I
THE HISTORICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND PRACTICE
CONTEXT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
SENTENCING LAW

There was much less criminal law in America fifty years ago.
There were fewer criminal statutes and they were generally

shorter, simpler, and less specific than many recent enactments.
Statutes tended to codify the long-standing common law definitions of crimes, and within that tradition states were free to

criminalize conduct as each saw fit. Criminal procedural law was
generally found in cases, not statutes. It was less technically de-

manding and not yet constitutionalized. Beyond the most basic
procedural requirements, such as jury trials for felonies, states

enforced their laws in a variety of ways with very little oversight
or intervention by courts or legislatures. 8
crimes and punishments to transfer power from judges to prosecutors by passing
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and other kinds of detailed criminal provisions that strengthen the prosecutor's position in plea bargaining. See William J.
Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 537-40
(2001) (discussing how over-criminalization expands prosecutorial power and noting
the alliance that developed between legislators and prosecutors in the late twentieth
century); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 108-12 (2003) (offering an example of how the addition of
new, more specific federal narcotics crimes and changes in sentencing law shifted
power to prosecutors in the period from 1985 to 2000). But even the relationship
between the adoption of detailed criminal statutes and increased prosecutorial
power depends upon and can be altered by changes in a variety of sentencing procedures. Thus, all things being equal, greater statutory specificity increases
prosecutorial bargaining leverage, except where judges retain broad sentencing discretion, where statutory sentencing ranges have significant overlap, where caseload
pressure and local culture result in lenient plea offers, or where any number of other
factors may counterbalance the impact of greater statutory specificity. It is a complex and uncertain business in which all things are rarely equal.
8 Of course, it can also be said that there was much more criminal law in America
in 1949 than there was in 1900. The rise of national markets, the emergence of the
Progressive era proto-regulatory state, the New Deal, and most importantly Prohibi-
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American criminal law has grown larger and more complex in
the last fifty years and its focus has shifted toward procedure.
There has been a great wave of re-codification. Many state systems have moved far from the common law tradition and significantly towards more detailed and specific criminal statutes. 9 As

the Supreme Court has constitutionalized criminal procedure,
federal law enforcement and federal adjudication of criminal
cases has grown tremendously.1 ° Along with a new level of com-

plexity, we have greater national consistency in our criminal law
and practice than we had in 1955. Yet, great variation in substantive law, procedure, and practice remains a signal feature of

American criminal law, given the diverse systems in place in the
fifty states, the District of Columbia, the federal courts, and the
military courts.11
Along with all of the variation, there are also unifying themes

in American criminal justice. From the end of World War II
through about 1980, the everyday practice of criminal law in
12
American courts was strongly influenced by the rehabilitative
tion, all sparked waves of new criminal statutes, new enforcement techniques, and
expansion of the federal role in criminal law and criminal enforcement. Waves of
federalization of criminal law have characterized American criminal justice since the
Fugitive Slave Act and the Civil War caused the first stirrings of the idea of a national American criminal law.
9 See generally Stuntz, supra note 7, at 515-20 (describing the growth of criminal
law in America).
10 See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997) (examining whether the politicizing
of crime that is causing an emphasis on harsher sentences is the right direction for
this country).
11 Looking across the varied landscape of American criminal justice, one can find
current examples of criminal sentencing in America that are characterized by unfettered judicial discretion, complete legislative control through mandatory sentencing,
jury sentencing or enforceable guideline sentencing, as well as a range of combinations of each variety of sentencing. Perhaps more importantly, very few of these
doctrines address, and none control, the process of plea bargaining, through which
we resolve the vast bulk of criminal cases. Finding guiding historical principles and
developing and enforcing useful general rules for this wide variety of doctrines and
practices is a central problem in American sentencing law. Even if we had useful
general principles, we would still find ourselves committed to an odd sort of semiregulated marketplace at the core of the whole enterprise.
12 The rehabilitative, or correctionalist, theory aims to reform the criminal so that
he or she will not re-offend. For an early European proponent of rehabilitation, see
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., BobbsMerrill Co. 1963) (1764). The rehabilitative movement took root in Victorian England and soon came to America. See THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE
PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Roth-
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theory of punishment,1 3 and the doctrines and practices furthering that goal in a concrete way. 14 This story begins early in that
era with Williams v. New York, a 1949 case that affirmed the

power of sentencing judges to consider a wide range of evidence
and use informal procedures at sentencing. 15 These very flexible
procedures made sense in the era of rehabilitative sentencing,

when judges imposed indeterminate terms for the purpose of reforming the individual who stood before the court. Every sentence was a fresh, creative, and interpretative act with the goal of
finding the correct approach for each unique defendant and his
or her problems and challenges.
Also, from the mid-1950s through the late 1970s, the American

justice system made an effort to bring the whole nation, particularly the South, into the modern era by ending institutionalized
racism and moderating excessive punishment through courtdriven procedural reform. Legislative interest in criminal law fo-

cused upon the substantive criminal law, as many states participated in the great wave of Model Penal Code inspired recodification. 6 The legislative focus on rehabilitative sentencing
and implementation of the substantive criminal law provisions of
the Model Penal Code was consistent with both the rehabilitative
man eds., 1995). In Michel Foucault's book, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF

THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1977), he offers the classic
theoretical treatment of the deep social roots of the rehabilitative idea in the development of modern society. For a trenchant application of Foucault's ideas to American criminal justice since World War II, see DAVID

GARLAND,

THE CULTURE OF

CONTROL (2001).

13 Professor Douglas Berman has insightfully argued that the cases discussed in
this Article are best understood in light of the shift from rehabilitation to retribution
as the dominant justification for criminal sanction. Douglas A. Berman, The Roots
and Realities of Blakely, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 5.
14 For a description of how the shift from the rehabilitative ideal and unfettered
judicial sentencing discretion to a system of retributive sentencing using enforceable
sentencing guidelines dramatically changed the power dynamics among judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers, and radically shifted the day to day practice of criminal
law, see Weinstein, supra note 7, at 101.
15 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
16 Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, at
xi (1985) (noting that by 1982, twenty years after the introduction of the Model
Penal Code in 1962, more than two-thirds of the states had re-codified their criminal
laws using the Model Penal Code as a starting point). Congress joined the effort,
but was unable to agree on a re-codification of the Federal Criminal Code, which
retains many older common law based statutes, despite having swollen with a plethora of more modern additions. See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code,
Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297,
315-16 (1998).
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ideal

7

and the Supreme Court-driven constitutionalization of

8
criminal procedural law in investigation and adjudication.'
The strains in our continued devotion to both rehabilitation

and the procedural revolution were evident by the early 1970s,

but criticism of both trends became dominant by the mid-1980s.
As David Garland has argued so trenchantly, during this period a
real rise in crime rates caused by changes in both family and
work life, coupled with the political upheavals of the late 1960s
and changes in the way the media covered crime, combined to repoliticize crime in America.1 9 By the mid-1970s, crime was on
the agenda of most politicians, and it had become standard fare

to criticize the courts for coddling criminals and letting them go
on "technicalities." The rehabilitative ideal, an idea that had
dominated penal theory for many years, suddenly collapsed.20
America was well on its way to what has become widely recognized as the politicization of crime and the one-way ratchet in
which criminal justice legislation only begets more penal law and
imposes even harsher sentences.2 1
The shift from the era of rehabilitation, and relatively less po17 The drafters of the Model Penal Code were strongly influenced by psychological ideas quite sympathetic to the rehabilitative ideal. My colleague, Professor
Deborah Denno, has explored the drafters' strong Freudian bent. See Deborah W.
Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV.
269 (2002). I am not arguing that only Freudian psychology is consistent with rehabilitation, but rather that like many other thinkers of that period, Wechsler and
others were strongly influenced by psychology in their thinking about both substantive criminal law and penal theory. This approach lends itself to treating crime as a
pathology that may be cured, as opposed, for example, to an approach influenced
more by economics, which views crime as an undesirable behavior to which a significant cost should be attached.
18 In addition to their shared intellectual roots in post-World War II American
modernism, these trends fit together in a functional way. They permitted the different criminal justice actors to focus on their own realms. Thus, legislatures focused
on the substantive law of crimes in this period and, following the lead of the Model
Penal Code drafters, did not address the law of sentencing or sentencing procedures
to any significant degree. Trial judges, particularly in the federal system, exercised
virtually unreviewable authority over sentencing, while the appellate courts focused
on regulating investigation and adjudication. The executive, which was beginning to
appreciate the possibilities of an expanded enforcement regime by the end of this
period, continued to roam the wide field defined by the expansive Anglo-American
principle of prosecutorial discretion.
19 GARLAND, supra note 12, at ch. 4; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering
Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 746-47 (2005).
20 GARLAND, supra note 12, at ch. 3 (describing and analyzing the sudden collapse of the rehabilitative ideal in the late 1970s).
21 See Beale, supra note 10.
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litical focus on crime, to the era of retributivism, 2 2 or modified

just deserts,2 3 and keen political interest in criminal justice provides the contextual key to understanding the Supreme Court's
dramatic doctrinal shifts on the permissible scope of judicially
imposed limits on legislative drafting of criminal statutes. By the
time one of the central and most cited cases in this line, Pennsylvania v. McMillan,24 came to the Court in 1986, much had
changed from the era of Williams. America had experienced a

real rise in serious crime over the twenty years from 1960 to 1980.
Crime had become an issue on every politician's agenda; the rehabilitative model had been replaced by a punitive form of retributivism;2 5 and a larger political realignment had empowered
critics of the "old school" of criminal justice. Almost nothing
22 Retributivism, or just deserts, holds that moral blameworthiness is a sufficient
justification for punishment, aside from any consequentialist justification. It has an
ancient lineage, often traced back to the Biblical "eye for an eye" formula. Immanuel Kant offered a retributivist justification of the criminal sanction in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans. 1887). An outstanding contemporary work on
retributivism and related ideas is JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988).
23 Modified just deserts is a theory of punishment that views retributivism through
the lens of proportionality and tempers it with a strong dose of specific deterrence or
incapacitation. Thus, it views moral blameworthiness as the prime reason for punishment, emphasizing escalating punishment as the offender's conduct grows more
blameworthy, and also gives relatively great weight to the likelihood that a particular offender will re-offend as a sufficient reason to increase punishment. It subordinates considerations of rehabilitation and general deterrence in sentencing. This
theory best explains the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H.
Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 51-54 (2003).
More broadly, modified just deserts theory is quite congenial to the social forces that
have moved toward more severe criminal sanctions over the past twenty-five years.
See generally, Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000); Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 217 (2001).
24 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
25 Increasing sentence severity became an explicit goal of the sentencing reform
movement. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
223, 284-87 (1993). Federal sentences grew much harsher in the early 1990s as the
Guidelines and a range of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes took hold. See
Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in FederalSentence Severity:
1980-1998, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 12 (1999). Many states made similar legal changes
starting in the mid-1980s and experienced similar sentencing trends from the late
1980s through the late 1990s. For a definitive analysis of these trends in federal
narcotics sentencing, which accounts for forty percent of the federal criminal docket
and is at the core of many of the changes in American criminal law over the past
thirty years, see Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An
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could be heard over the full-throated political roar favoring har-

sher sentences. At the same time, but for different political reasons, the imperial federal judiciary of the 1960s and 1970s was
under political attack and majoritarianism was on the rise. In the
midst of what seemed like a broad political consensus, the Court
went down the road of unfettered legislative discretion to define

crimes with almost no judicial oversight.
Of course, the reemergence of crime as a hot button political
issue was just one piece of a larger dynamic of shifting intellectual, sociological, and economic forces during the second half of

the twentieth century. Changing social patterns and urbanization
driven by a fear of crime,2 6 the civil rights struggle, America's

shifting religious landscape, and, more recently, changes in policing strategies 27 and technologies, 28 as well as the rise of terrorism
as a defining security and criminal law issue of our time, 29 have
all shaped our current attitudes toward criminal justice. In broad
stroke, the criminal law and criminal procedure doctrines I examine here were buffeted by a real rise and then fall in crime,3 ° a
significant shift in ideas of personal responsibility, a cycling of
power away from and perhaps back to courts, and the emergence
of new threats and new methods of detection, enforcement, and

proof.
Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the
District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477 (2002).
26 See GARLAND, supra note 12, at 161-63.
27 The best known example of this new style of policing, sometimes called "public
order policing," is often associated with the Broken Windows theory first put forward by James Q. Wilson. The theory emphasizes vigorous enforcement of minor
offenses. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. The link between aggressive enforcement of minor
offenses in targeted neighborhoods and a decrease in crime is far from clear, but the
decrease in crime appears real. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject:
A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows
Theory, and Order-MaintenancePolicing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291, 293,
377-84 (1998); Ana Joanes, Does the New York City Police Department Deserve
Creditfor the Decline in New York City's Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 265,
274-81 (2000).
28 See GARLAND, supra note 12, at 160-63.
29 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone'sRevenge: An Essay on

the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618-24
(2005) (arguing that the rise of terrorism as a criminal justice concern creates new
incentives for prosecutors to use the problematic tool of pretextual prosecution).
30 However, perceptions of crime continued to rise. See Beale, supra note 10, at
47-51. As well, salient events like the crack epidemic of the late 1980s continued to
feed the perception of spiraling disorder.
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As is often the case, society began to change before politicians
or the law recognized it. As people began to adjust to falling
crime rates, new technology and old political concerns whetted
the public appetite for stories of wrongful convictions and police
misconduct. In the shifting criminal justice sands of the turn of
the twentieth century, the Court seized the opportunity to push
back against legislative dominance in the criminal arena, motivated by a combination of institutional imperative, congruent individual views on how the Constitution should be read,3 1 and
perhaps the view that severity had gone too far. It did not make
for pellucid doctrine, but it is an example of how we regulate
American criminal justice by recalibrating the relationships
among the several players who share and balance power in our
criminal justice system.
II
THE MODERN JURISPRUDENCE BEGINS WITH
WLLIAMS V. NEW YORK AND BROAD
JUDICIAL DISCRETION

The modern American constitutional procedural law of sentencing3 2 began with Williams v. New York ," a case that clearly

captures the post-World War II faith in expertise and the power
31 Perhaps this is only an obscure way of saying that there is no really satisfying
explanation for how Justice Scalia came around to a position for which Justice Stevens had long argued.
32 The Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence has been largely procedural.
Substantive appellate review of federal sentencing did not exist before the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines. See Dorszynski v. United States,
418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). The
development of the doctrine of non-reviewability and its weakening through increasing procedural scrutiny of federal sentencing by courts of appeals is discussed in
Robert J. Kutak and J. Michael Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A
Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463 (1974) (demonstrating convincingly that courts of appeals occasionally used procedural dress to remand
egregious sentences, but arguing for appellate review because the doctrine of nonreviewability prevented the development of sentencing standards). Although the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines offered an opportunity for the Court to develop a
substantive law of sentencing, its shrinking docket did not address those issues, displaying a continued preference for procedural cases such as Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
More fundamentally, a very weak doctrine of proportionality review is a rejection of
the most likely constitutional basis for broad, substantive regulation of criminal sentencing and undergirds the significant authority Congress and each state legislature
maintains over the substantive law of sentencing. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11 (2003) (rejecting a challenge to California's three strikes law); Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983). A current and quite useful reassessment of this area of law is con-
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of psychology and social work. The Supreme Court's first look at
sentencing in the modern era reflects the solid grasp of rehabilitation as the dominant penal theory of this period.
Samuel Williams was convicted of murder, and the jury recommended a sentence of life in prison.3 4 The trial judge sentenced
him to death, relying upon facts contained in a pre-sentence report.35 The defendant argued that he was entitled to confront the
witnesses against him at the sentencing hearing, but the Supreme
Court upheld the sentence. 3 6 The Court ruled that the defendant's sentencing was properly governed by much more relaxed
rules of procedure than those governing trial. 37 The Court drew
a bright line between the jury role in adjudicating guilt or innocence and the judicial role in fashioning an individualized sentence in the era of indeterminate, rehabilitative sentencing.
Although Williams is no longer good death penalty law, it is
still cited for the proposition that there is a well-settled American
legal practice history of sentencing judges exercising discretion
about both the mechanics of sentencing and the nature of the
sentence imposed. 38 The Supreme Court endorsed a flexible set
of sentencing procedures in Williams, noting that the ultimate
aim was for the judge to impose a proper, individualized sentence that would promote rehabilitation. 39 That goal, seen
through the lens of the reigning psychological and social service
understanding of the day, was inherently individualistic. The
judge needed to understand enough about an individual defendant to impose a sentence that held out the hope of reforming
him or her. This was not a sentencing regime built primarily
tained in Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91
VA. L. REV. 677 (2005).

33 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
34 Id. at 242.

35 Id. at 242-43.
36 Id. at 243.

37 See id. at 251-52.
38 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (noting that "judges in this
country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentences within
statutory limits in the individual case" (emphasis omitted)); see, e.g., Williams, 337
U.S. at 246 (discussing that "both before and since the American colonies became a
nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed
within limits fixed by law").
39 337 U.S. at 247-48.
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upon concerns about uniformity and retribution.4 °
The Williams Court reminded us that sentencing procedures
would remain subject to due process scrutiny, citing Townsend v.
Burke. 4 ' However, the egregious facts of Townsend, involving
an obvious factual mistake by the sentencing judge in a case involving an uncounseled defendant, suggest just how undemanding that scrutiny would be. Williams and its progeny, including
Brady v. Maryland42 and United States v. Grayson,'4 established
that individualized, rehabilitative sentencing was governed by
much less demanding procedural requirements than was a trial.
Williams reflected the longstanding understanding of the division of authority between the judge and jury. The line between
guilt and innocence remained the province of the jury, with all of
the strong procedural protections afforded by the Constitution.
Once a defendant was found guilty, punishment was generally
the province of the judge.4 4 The key was, and remains, drawing
the line at which the Sixth Amendment jury trial right attaches,
along with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The contours of the procedural rights due at sentencing have
long been anchored at the line between the elements of the offense,4 5 which must go to the jury, and other factors relevant to
40 In the American view of rehabilitative sentencing, the judge must figure out
how to shape the sentence to address the particular psychological and social issues
that led a particular individual to make bad choices. Although this is a strong and
longstanding connection in our law and reflects our criminal law's deep commitment
to individual will and autonomy, it is a connection contingent upon our particular
view of autonomy and choice. Rehabilitation may be very differently conceived.
Political reeducation, as practiced by other regimes, suggests how rehabilitation can
be understood as a standardized group practice rather than an individualized one.
41 337 U.S. at 252 n.18 (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (granting
relief to an uncounseled defendant whose sentence was enhanced based on the sentencing court's erroneous belief that the defendant had been convicted of certain
offenses, when in fact it was the defendant's brother who had been convicted of
those crimes)).
42 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory material to
the defense).
43 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (affirming a sentence enhanced by a judicial finding that the
defendant had lied during his trial testimony).
44 While this had long been true in England, the federal system, and much of
America, some American states have long used jury sentencing. See generally Jenia
Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REv. 311 (2003) (noting that six states employ jury sentencing in non-capital cases and arguing for its
expansion in light of Apprendi).
45 For an outstanding current discussion of the history and difficulties of the elements test, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements
in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (arguing that the strong form
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sentencing, which need not be adjudicated by the jury and may
be determined in a less formal procedure.
III
THE CENTRAL QUESTION EMERGES IN MULLANEY
AND PATTERSON: WHAT IS AN ELEMENT?

In the modern era of criminal jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court began to draw the line between the demanding Sixth
Amendment jury trial right and the less demanding due process
right to a fair sentencing procedure in Mullaney v. Wilbur46 and
Patterson v. New York.4 7 This very important and hard to reconcile pair of cases examines what consequences flow from the
broad state power, exercised primarily by the legislature, to define crimes and determine the punishment attendant upon conviction. Although neither case involves a direct challenge to a
sentence or sentencing procedure, in our system of indirect regulation of the dominant guilty plea regime, the cases loom large in
the sentencing landscape.
In Mullaney, the Court affirmed the grant of a writ of habeas
corpus to Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., who had been convicted of
murder in Maine.4 8 Maine's common law-based murder statute
included the traditional mens rea requirement of malice aforethought. 9 The wrinkle in Maine law was that for many years,
proof of an intentional, unlawful killing gave rise to a rebuttable
presumption of malice aforethought.5 ° Once the presumption
was invoked, the defendant could then prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that he acted on sudden provocation,
which reduced the crime to manslaughter.5 1 Relying on In re
of the elements test adopted by the Supreme Court has weak historical roots, the
rules are responsive to problems that modem criminal law no longer faces, and the
elements test does not address the issues presented by our plea bargaining regime).
46 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
47 432 U.S. 197 (1977).

48 421 U.S. at 685, 690-91.
49 Id. at 686. Malice aforethought is the term of art for the mens rea required for

murder under the common law. Generally, malice aforethought includes all killings
that (1) were intentional; (2) resulted from acts done with the intent to inflict grievous bodily injury; (3) resulted from acts done with extremely reckless disregard for
human life; or (4) resulted from the commission of or from the flight from a felony.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.02(B)(2) (3d ed. 2001).
50
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686-87.
51 Id. Heat of passion, or passion and provocation, is the common law doctrine
that reduces murder to manslaughter if the defendant acted in the heat of passion
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Winship,52 the Court focused on the historical significance of the
line between murder and manslaughter and held that the state
must bear the burden of proof on, and prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the issue of the absence of provocation.5 3
Although Mullaney struck a blow against unfettered state
power to define crimes, this opening salvo in what became a

lengthy and complex campaign was very carefully aimed. The
defendant initially challenged his conviction in the Maine state
courts, arguing that the statute created two separate crimes, with
separate elements that must be proven by the prosecution.54 The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the statute created only
one crime, felonious homicide, with two different degrees. 5 The

lower federal courts disagreed with the Maine court's reading of
the Maine statute and adopted the petitioner's two crimes approach. 6 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
federal courts' result, but rejected their reinterpretation of Maine
law.57
The Court ruled that the state courts are ultimate expositors of
state law, and accepted the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's view

that the Maine statute created one crime with two distinct degrees.58 The Court went on to frame the issue in terms of the
burden of proof, questioning whether "the Maine rule requiring

the defendant to prove that he acted in the hear [sic] of passion
resulting from adequate provocation without a sufficient lapse of time for the passion to cool. DRESSLER, supra note 49, § 31.07(A).
52 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
53 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696-701.
54 Id. at 687.
55 Id. at 688.
56 Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 946-47 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 1139
(1974) (mem.); Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D. Me. 1972), affd, 473
F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974) (mem.).
57 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 690-91, 703. The picture was a bit more complex. After
this case was decided by the First Circuit, the Maine Supreme Court reaffirmed its
view that the Maine statute created only one crime with two different degrees and
sharply criticized the First Circuit's view of state law. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647
(Me. 1973). After Lafferty was decided, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Mullaney v. Wilbur and remanded it to the First Circuit for reconsideration in light of Lafferty. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974) (mem.). The First
Circuit then accepted the Maine court's interpretation of Maine law and reaffirmed
the grant of the writ, this time relying on In re Winship. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496
F.2d 1303, 1307 (1st Cir. 1974). It then ruled, as the Supreme Court would have, that
the prosecution had to bear the burden of proof on the issue of the nonexistence of
mitigating provocation once that issue was fairly raised by the defense. Id.
58 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691.
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on sudden provocation accords with due process."5 9 This framing of the question reminds us why Mullaney is a beloved evidence case, and one of the few High Court opinions that
discusses presumptions in criminal cases, a subject left unaddressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.6" It also highlights
how careful the Court was, and remains, in finding a balance
among issues of federalism, separation of powers, and fundamental fairness in criminal cases.
The Court offered a two-step analysis of this procedurally
framed question. Beginning with the substantive law, the Court
reviewed the history of the murder/manslaughter distinction in
common law.6 1 It found that mitigating provocation was "the
single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide," and that there was a
clear trend of requiring the prosecution to bear the burden on
that fact. 62 That analysis would have permitted the Court to answer the procedural question of Mullaney with this historically
based analysis of the substantive question. The Court might have
simply said that when the substantive law has historically defined
the particular fact at issue as the most important factor determining the severity of the offense, the fact must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. But the Court did not stop there.
The second step of the analysis then responded to a limiting
argument that this historical analysis opened: even if this history
was right, In re Winship still did not require invalidating the
Maine scheme because the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt only applies to facts which would wholly exonerate the defendant.6 3 On this analysis, the question of guilt or
innocence is completely divorced from the question of degree of
culpability.' The suggestion was that the magnitude of being
convicted of any crime, and so being stigmatized as a criminal, is
so grave that the full panoply of rights must attach to that decision. 5 On this argument, once a person is convicted, the issue of
59

Id.at 692.

Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence only addresses presumptions in
civil cases. FED. R. EviD. 301. Congress rejected proposed Rule 303, which addressed presumptions in criminal cases. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
60

LAIRD

C.

KIRKPATRICK,

2004

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 692-96.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 697-98.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 698.
61
62
63

285-88 (2004).
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the degree of the person's criminal culpability is of so much less
significance that fewer procedural rights should attach to that
determination.6 6
Mullaney decisively rejected that argument,6 7 although the argument soon reemerged and loomed large in late twentieth century sentencing. The Mullaney Court's rejection of a bright line
between criminal liability and degree of culpability speaks to
both the substantive law and the procedural understanding necessary to vindicate that substantive principle. The substantive
criminal law point was that Anglo-American criminal law takes
both the guilt or innocence finding and the determination of the
degree of culpability quite seriously. Our substantive law has
long carefully defined crimes and ranked them. It has never simply created one broad category of malefactor and lumped all
wrongdoers together.6"
The Court next reminded us that a procedural question, like
the assignment of burdens, must not be allowed to swallow the
substantive law principle, but rather must be interpreted to protect it.69 As the Court noted, if In re Winship were not found to
limit Maine law in this case, "a State could undermine many of
the interests that decision sought to protect . . . redef[ining] the
elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment."7
Like so many important cases, Mullaney has been read and
reread for different propositions. It may be most narrowly understood as holding that true presumptions can never operate in
favor of the prosecution upon an element of a criminal offense.
Although Mullaney certainly stands for that proposition, that understanding of the case sheds no light on how to distinguish elements from other factors. The case may be a bit more broadly
understood as holding that common law-based crimes have elements so deeply rooted in our law that they cannot be altered by
the legislature or the courts. As we shall see, that historically
based rationale offers a way to cabin Mullaney's reach, but does
not provide a broad enough understanding to answer the quesId.
Id. at 701-03.
Although, the indeterminate sentencing during the middle of the twentieth century and the sentencing law from the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act
until Booker both pushed quite hard on that understanding.
69 See id. at 698.
70 Id.
66
67
68
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tions posed by subsequent cases. Mullaney may be most broadly
understood as establishing the Supreme Court's authority to review and rule upon the substantive adequacy of legislative definitions of criminal offenses and the related legislative or judicial
doctrines of procedure that govern adjudication under those statutes. Although that third and broadest reading of Mullaney is
consistent with the current state of the law, there remains great
uncertainty about the standards to be applied in such a review.
The reach of Mullaney has ebbed and flowed over time. In reviving the broader reading of this chestnut, United States v.
Booker7 is Mullaney's revenge.
The Court returned to the problem of the interplay between
the substantive definition of a crime and procedural regulation of
proof of the crime in the following term. Patterson v. New York 72
addressed a very similar statute and reached a conclusion hard to
square with Mullaney. Perhaps more than most Supreme Court
cases involving closely related questions, Mullaney and Patterson
can only be understood as a pair, each limiting the other, with the
law in this area very much dependent on which case is currently
dominant. Just as Mullaney curtailed legislative and judicial discretion, Patterson extended it.
In Patterson, the Supreme Court upheld the recently re-codified and heavily Model Penal Code-influenced New York homicide statute.7 3 New York law made all intentional killings the
highest grade of non-capital murder and permitted the defendant
to come forward and prove the mitigating defense of extreme
emotional disturbance, which reduces the offense to the next
lower grade of murder.7 4 As many have observed, there is scant
difference between the statute disapproved in Mullaney and the
statute approved in Patterson. Maine could not shift the burden
to the defendant by requiring the defendant to prove lack of malice aforethought in order to mitigate murder to manslaughter.
New York could, however, define the highest grade of murder to
include all intentional murders and assign the burden of proof on
the affirmative mitigating defense to the defendant. The net effect of the two statutes is the same - intentional murder is the
highest grade and the defendant has the burden to prove mitiga71125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
72 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
73 Id. at 201 (ruling on N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2004)).
74 Id. at 205-06.
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tion to manslaughter. Yet, the Maine statute was held to violate
the requirement that the state prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, while the New York statute
was upheld.
The Patterson majority squared its result with Mullaney by
limiting the reach of the earlier case.7 5 Justice White read Mullaney for the narrow proposition that once Maine used the language "malice aforethought," it was committed to that traditional
element and could not introduce a presumption in favor of the
prosecution.76 In this light, the pair of cases sets very broad and
historically rooted restrictions upon legislative drafting of criminal statutes. But once Mullaney and Patterson opened the door
to Supreme Court review of how legislatures define crimes, the
cases could not be so easily cabined. Although the requirement
that an element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to
the jury seemed to provide a very broad field for legislative action, changing styles of criminal law legislation would make those
boundaries much more problematic than they first appeared.
Reconciling Mullaney and Patterson by limiting Mullaney to
the particulars of historically rooted common law statutes may
have resolved the immediate problem, but it was never an adequate solution. We might say that although the legislature is free
to define new crimes, its options are more limited when it uses a
well-developed common law scheme. A related political consideration, relevant in 1978, was the Court's reluctance to strike
down a strongly Model Penal Code-influenced statute during the
prime years of Model Penal Code-influenced re-codification of
state codes.77 While each observation has force, neither brings
the law to a stable rule. If Mullaney is really limited to common
law statutes that have historical roots limiting the legislature,
how are we to understand Patterson'slanguage, consistent with
Mullaney, that "there are obviously constitutional limits beyond
which the States may not go"? 78 What are those limits when the
legislature drafts outside the common law tradition?
75 Id. at 214-16.
76 Id.

at 215.

The majority opinion recognizes that the statute under review is part of the
Model Penal Code influenced re-codification movement. Id. at 207 n.10 (discussing
the role of affirmative defenses in the then-current New York Penal Law and noting
that twenty-two states had already reformed their penal laws since the completion of
the Model Penal Code in 1962).
78 Id. at 210.
77
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In his dissent, Justice Powell foreshadowed this problem.7 9 He
argued that the Patterson majority vaunted form over substance
by giving the legislature the authority to redefine elements as affirmative defenses, eviscerating the central protection of our requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which had
recently been reaffirmed by In re Winship." He argued for a
Winship/Mullaney rule, which would examine whether the fact at
issue makes a significant difference in punishment and whether it
is historically rooted.8 1 Justice Powell was quite right to search
for a rule that would ground this area in more than formal drafting requirements. While the standard for which Justice Powell
argued captures the difference between Mullaney and Patterson,
it offers little guidance to a criminal law expanding far beyond its
historical common law roots. In the cases that followed, Justice
Stevens led the search for another way to ground the question of
what is an element, and what, therefore, must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, in more than statutory drafting rules rooted
in history.
The jurisprudence of the late 1970s through the late 1980s and
the waning of the era of proceduralist adjudication and rehabilitative sentencing bequeathed us a vague understanding of the
term "element." The law gave state legislatures great discretion
in defining crimes and allocating burdens of proof. For example,
state legislators could categorize all intentional murders as homicide and give defendants the burden of proof on defenses as
traditional and deeply rooted as self-defense. 2 This broad legislative power to define crimes was counterbalanced by broad judicial sentencing discretion, and did not, at first, confront the many
procedural challenges raised by mandatory sentencing schemes.
That would change, but the lack of clarity and underdevelopment
of a body of doctrine defining the notion of an element of a criminal statute remained a central ambiguity in American sentencing
law. Indeed, many of the sentencing law innovations of the late
1980s and 1990s survived because of the Supreme Court's reluctance to elaborate a meaningful definition of element, and instead to view this area as one of largely unfettered legislative
discretion.
79 Id. at 216-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).

80 Id. at 229-32.
81 Id. at 225-27.
82 See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233 (1987).
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Even as the Court reaffirmed its broad approach to the meaning of element in Martin v. Ohio 83 pressure had already begun to
build as legislatures stepped away from indeterminate sentencing
and rehabilitation and began their long effort to limit judicial discretion. So long as there was a clear divide between the extensive procedural protection of trial and the discretionary regime
of sentencing, the model of Williams was workable, whether or
not it was good policy. As legislatures began to enact mandatory
sentencing statutes that tied sentencing to fact-finding, strains began to appear.
IV
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION TRIUMPHANT:
MCMILLAN V. PENNSYLVANIA AND

SENTENCING FACTORS

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the keystone of this line of cases,
involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that imposed a
mandatory minimum five-year sentence on any person convicted
of an enumerated felony who the sentencing judge found to have
visibly carried a firearm during the commission of the crime.84
McMillan was the first of the Court's modern sentencing cases to
address a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, a style of
criminal legislation that gained popularity in the 1980s.8 5 Although the Court analyzed the case in doctrinal terms, as it
should, the facts of the case bespeak the struggle for control of
the criminal process. The Court offered this description of the
proceedings after each defendant in these consolidated cases was
convicted of a qualifying underlying offense:
In each case the Commonwealth gave notice that at sentencing
it would seek to proceed under the Act. No § 9712 hearing
was held, however, because each of the sentencing judges
before whom petitioners appeared found the Act unconstitutional; each
imposed a lesser sentence than that required by
86
the Act.
This restrained and technical language described a clash that
would be repeated again and again. The legislature would pass a
83 See 480 U.S. 228.
84 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986).
85 For a discussion of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes in federal courts
and the ways they change the dynamics of criminal cases, see Weinstein, supra note
7.
86 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82.
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statute that gave prosecutors new power over sentencing by tying
punishment to the charging decision through a mandatory minimum sentence. The sentencing judge then resisted this diminution in judicial authority occasioned by the contraction of
sentencing discretion. Consequently, the appellate courts would
have to resolve the conflict between the legislators and prosecutors on one side and the judges on the other. McMillan sided
decisively with the legislators and prosecutors through a ruling
that revisited the difficult question of the meaning of the term
"element of an offense."
The Supreme Court ruled that the Act under review in McMillan created a sentencing factor, not a new crime. 7 Writing for
the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the precedents drew no bright line rule between elements and sentencing
factors.8 8 This, he told us, is a matter of "differences of degree." 9 In a passage distinguishing the sentencing factors in the
Pennsylvania statute from the burden shifting element in the
Maine statute ruled unconstitutional in Mullaney, the Court
noted:
Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime
committed nor creates a separateoffense calling for a separate
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available
to it without
the special finding of visible possession of a
90
firearm.
This passage became central to our understanding of the distinction between elements and sentencing factors for eighteen
years, from McMillan through Blakely v. Washington ,"t although
the doctrinal tension caused by the changing pressures of onrushing events upon this vague standard became evident earlier. As
unfettered judicial sentencing discretion gave way to a variety of
legislatively imposed reviewable sentencing requirements, our
understanding of the phrase "a penalty within the range already
available to [the court] without the special finding" 92 began to
waver and change.
87

Id. at 85-86.

88

Id. at 91.

89
90

Id.

Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
91 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Though, a brief period of uncertainty existed between
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
92 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
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In one light, the essence of the shift that led to Booker was the
turn from the McMillan understanding of element and maximum
sentence to our current understanding. Under McMillan, the elements of the crime were the particular facts necessary to determine whether the defendant was guilty and liable for punishment

up to the maximum term set by the legislative enactment that
defined the crime.9 3 It made no difference whether the sentenc-

ing court was required to give any particular sentence within any
range the legislature might establish. Factors that determined
where in the range a defendant was actually sentenced were only

sentencing factors, not elements, and were only subject to the
lesser procedural restrictions of Williams and its progeny. This is
the understanding so well argued by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Apprendi v. New Jersey,9" and long articulated by Justices
Breyer and Kennedy. 95 Booker, as we shall see, offered a

broader understanding of the maximum sentence concept, extending to all rules that establish the enforceable top of the sentencing range. Of course this shift did not occur all at once, and
the particular contours of the shift left McMillan standing, if
greatly limited. So how did we get from McMillan to Booker?
One key to the shift is found in Justice Stevens' continued critique of the application of Williams-style minimalist procedural
protections, appropriate to an era of rehabilitation and broad judicial discretion, to the world of enforceable guidelines and retributivist sentencing. 96 Justice Stevens has trenchantly argued
that Mullaney and Patterson, properly read, provide the tools to
93

The McMillan Court's understanding of this question was an explicit, although
unstated, rejection of the Mullaney dicta tying the strongest procedural protections
to determinations of both guilt or innocence and the degree of the crime, and resulting punishment, for which the defendant is liable.
94 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

95 A series of cases, including Jones, Apprendi, Blakely, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), and Booker, shifted and broadened the legal understanding of the statutory maximum concept in McMillan, and later renamed the concept the "prescribed
range of penalties." Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Blakely, told us that
statutory maximum is the "maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 124 S.
Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) (emphasis omitted). Rejecting the prior rule defining the statutory maximum as the maximum term set out in the legislative enactment defining
the crime, Blakely's broader definition swept enforceable sentencing guidelines into
the category of elements for purposes of In re Winship and Patterson.
96 Viewed in terms of Court politics, the shift may be seen as Justice Scalia's longterm movement toward Justice Stevens' position. Of course Justice Scalia developed
his position in the context of originalism and its historical perspective, while Justice
Stevens remained ever sensitive to the evolving context of American criminal law
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identify and rein in legislative excesses. In his McMillan dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that there is a more fundamental distinction underneath the apparently formalist rule about presumptions in cases involving historically rooted statutes.9 7 He argued
that the cases identify a line between aggravating and mitigating
factors, which captured an essential legal and political difference
between facts that increase punishment and those that mitigate
punishment.9 8 Natural political limits exist on the legislative
transformation of elements into mitigating factors, so they need
not be constrained in the same way. 99 Legislators are unlikely to
pass extreme versions of "Patterson statutes" - statutes that
broadly criminalize conduct and then burden defendants with
mitigating defenses.10 0 He offered the example of criminalizing
the act of walking into a bank, but permitting defendants to
prove that they are not bank robbers.1 ' Such a scheme would
face intense political opposition.
Although his example was suggestive, recent experience shows
Justice Stevens may have underestimated the public's willingness
to accept broad criminal statutes. On the other hand, recent efforts to address corporate wrongdoing suggest that there is real
political sensitivity to extending criminal sanctions to cases in
which traditional markers of criminality may be less clear.
Whatever the merits of his position on the dangers of overuse of
mitigating factors for which the defendant has the burden, his
argument on the political dangers of aggravating factors was
powerful.
Aggravating factors are quite different, Justice Stevens told us,
because there is much less political backlash to imposing harsher
penalties upon those already convicted of some crime. The experience of the last twenty years shows how politically expedient it
can be to expose people convicted of any crime to horrendously
harsh sentences - opposing those statutes is just being "soft on
criminals." That has been our experience with sentencing factors, which have mushroomed since McMillan, and, unlike mitiand the interplay of shifting substantive law and procedure. But in the end, Justice
Scalia voted with Justice Stevens in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely.
97 477 U.S. at 99-101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 100-01.
99 Id. at 100-02.
100

Id. at 101-02.
101 Id. at 100-01.
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gating factors, seem to have broader political limits than many

anticipated.
The experience of the late 1980s and 1990s suggests there is a
real difference between aggravating and mitigating factors, as
Justice Stevens argued. His dissent in McMillan foreshadowed

much of the basic structure of the law today. He argued for
Court scrutiny of the process of finding facts that establish the
enforceable top of the sentencing range, a requirement that characterizes Apprendi and its progeny.1" 2 His views on mitigating

factors have been somewhat oddly transformed into a distinct set
of rules governing facts that establish the bottom of the sentencing range, as in Harrisv. United States,103 an opinion from which
he dissented." °4 But back in 1986, Justice Stevens was still in the
minority in the sentencing cases and McMillan was the law. Legislative power to define crimes and punishments, and to set the

procedural requirements for criminal adjudication and sentencing, was largely unfettered by meaningful judicial review.
V
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION AND OVERREACHING:
WITTE, WATTS, ALMENDAREZ-TORRES, AND THE APPARENT
END OF LIMITS ON LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO CONTROL
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES

New questions involving procedural protections at sentencing

began to come before the Court in the mid-1990s, as the federal
appellate courts began to sort through the issues presented by
the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines,1 °5 and the explosion of
mandatory minimum and repeat offender statutes at both the
federal and state levels. 10 6 As the Court began to review the ex102 Id. at 103-04.

103 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (holding that a statute increasing the minimum sentence after fact finding by the judge rather than by the jury does not violate a defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights).
104 Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
JJ.).
105 The statutory directive to draft the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000). The Guidelines are set out in the FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MA5 UAL (2004). Issues involving the application of the Guidelines
only began to come before the Court once it rejected the initial separation of powers
attack on the entire system in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
106 For discussions of the enthusiasm for legislative sentencing enactments that
both curtailed judicial discretion and increased sentence severity, see Weinstein,
supra note 7.
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ercise of ascendant legislative authority it had encouraged, or at
least countenanced in Patterson and McMillan, the doctrinal
machinations needed to fit the flexible procedures appropriate to
an era of less aggressive criminal legislation to the enactments of
the late 1980s and 1990s, which passed from the baroque to the
rococo. The devotion to legislative supremacy in criminal law, as
embodied in Williams, Patterson, and McMillan reached, or
overreached, to the extreme results of Witte v. United States,"°7
United States v. Watts, 108 and Almendarez-Torres v. United
States. 109
In Witte, the Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge to a
federal prosecution for cocaine distribution based on conduct involving cocaine that had already been used as relevant conduct
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to enhance the defendant's sentence in a prior prosecution for marijuana distribution.1 10 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court and relying upon
Patterson and McMillan, argued that the sentencing court in the
first case, considering the marijuana charge, was not punishing
the defendant for the act of distributing cocaine, only for the
charged offense of marijuana distribution."1 In the course of
sentencing for distributing marijuana, the sentencing court, in deciding how to use its traditional sentencing discretion, properly
considered the defendant's character as a person who had distributed substantial amounts of drugs. 112 Only the second prosecution punished him for distributing cocaine. 113 To the extent
that the defendant might be punished twice in a broad sense, if
not in the technical sense of punishment which limits the Double
Jeopardy Clause, any unfairness was mitigated by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of total punishment. 114 Justice
O'Connor drew on both the Court's double jeopardy jurispru515 U.S. 389 (1995).
519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
109 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
110 515 U.S. at 391, 406. In that prior prosecution, the government brought a
charge of marijuana distribution, although the facts involved distribution of both
marijuana and cocaine. Id. at 392-93. While sentencing for the marijuana offense,
the first sentencing court also considered the cocaine distribution as relevant conduct under the FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3. Witte, 515
U.S. at 393-94.
111 Witte, 515 U.S. at 396, 401.
112 See id. at 401.
113 See id. at 402.
107

108

1 14

See id. at 404-06.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84, 2005]

dence for a very narrow understanding of what it means to "punish" for the instant offense and the broad McMillan
understanding of what constitutes a traditional sentencing factor
going to the defendant's character.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued the fundamental unfairness of the result, recognized that Williams fit the era of judicial
discretion, not enforceable guidelines, continued his critique of
McMillan, and took issue with the majority's application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.' 1 5 His argument began with the
straightforward observation that the petitioner in this case was
punished for distributing cocaine and then put in jeopardy of
punishment again for that same conduct. 1 16 He first argued that
only a formalistic reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause could
take this case outside its reach." 7 He argued that a better understanding of the relationship between double jeopardy and sentencing must recognize the traditional distinction between the
character of the offender and the character of the offense. 118 Justice Stevens noted that prior convictions considered in criminal
history are clearly relevant to the defendant's character and
clearly fall under the line of cases carving out recidivism as a
traditional sentencing factor under McMillan.119 But relevant
conduct goes to the character of the offense. In addition, he
made the explicit connection between changes in sentencing law
and the need to reexamine procedural principles when he noted:
[I]n traditional sentencing regimes, it is impossible to determine for what purpose the sentencer has relied on the relevant
offenses. In my view ... the Court's failure to recognize the
change in sentencing practices caused by the Guidelines, cause
it to overlook an important
and obvious violation of the
20
Double Jeopardy Clause.'
Justice Stevens continued, arguing that the limited procedural
protections of Williams were set in the context of information
about the character of the accused, not the character of the offense, and did not work in this new era in which statutory provisions make such a strong and explicit connection between the
115 See id. at 407-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 407-08.

117

Id. at 411.

118

Id.at 412.

119 See id. at 409-10.
120

Id. at 412.
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character of the offense and the severity of the punishment. 121
The dissent then granted that McMillan was the governing law,
but that even in that context, the structure of the Guidelines cut
against the majority's approach.12 2 He noted that under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, relevant conduct is an offense characteristic, not an offender characteristic.2 3 Thus, not only as a
conceptual matter, but as a matter of the actual Guidelines' rules,
relevant conduct is an offense characteristic under the Guidelines, and the defendant was being punished for his conduct, not
his character, in the first offense, triggering double jeopardy
124
protection.
Although Witte is a double jeopardy case and draws on that
line of cases, it is also an important sentencing case. The Court
relied, as it must have, on a broad reading of McMillan to reach
its result. The result in Witte is only doctrinally consistent if the
Court continues "rejecting the claim that whenever a State links
the 'severity of punishment' to 'the presence or absence of an
identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt." '2 5 Only an explicit (and hard to defend) uncoupling
of the guilt/innocence line from the determination of the severity
of the crime and sentence supports the Court's claim that, in any
useful sense, the defendant in Witte was not twice punished for
the same conduct. If the government had been required to twice
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Witte had committed the
conduct at issue, it is difficult to see how the double jeopardy
claim could have been denied in any but the most unconvincing
manner.
The Court's commitment to the broad reading of Williams v.
Oklahoma's126 message regarding judicial sentencing, and the
very real friction between that idea and more than ten years of
active legislative efforts to cabin that discretion and compel
judges to impose uniform and severe sentences, was well-illustrated by the Court's decision in United States v. Watts.127
121 See id. at 412-13.
122 See id. at 413.
23

1

Id. at 411.

124 Id. at 411-12.

125 Id. at 401 (majority opinion).
126 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), should not be confused with Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), which Justice Stevens cites in his dissent in
Witte, 515 U.S. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 See 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
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Watts was one of a pair of cases from the Ninth Circuit in
which the defendant went to trial on multiple counts and was
convicted on some counts but acquitted on others. 1 28 In both
cases, the sentencing judge considered the conduct underlying
the acquittals as relevant conduct under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 29 Finding that the conduct could be considered as
relevant conduct under the Guidelines, and was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 3 ' both sentencing courts enhanced
the sentences for the convictions to a term within the statutory
maximum for the counts of conviction, but higher than the sentence that would have been imposed without inclusion of the rel13 1
evant conduct.
In a per curiam opinion granting certiorari and reversing without full briefing, the Court sided with all of the other circuit
courts of appeals and reversed the Ninth Circuit in holding that
132
the sentencing courts had acted properly in these two cases.
The Court treated as well-settled the principle that the procedures governing a judge's choice of a particular sentence, so long
as it does not exceed the statutory maximum set by the statute
defining the offense, are quite separate from, and much more relaxed than, those that govern the determination of the defendant's guilt. 133 The first paragraph of the opinion closed with,
"[b]ecause the panels' holdings conflict with the clear implication
of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court's
decisions, particularly Witte v. United States, we grant the petition
and reverse in both cases.' 1 34 Walking a path now clear, the
Court cited 18 U.S.C. § 3661, the statute imposing "no limita35
tion" on the information to be considered at sentencing.
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justice Kennedy, again
noted that Williams-style procedural sentencing discretion means
128 Id.at 149-51.
29

1

Id. at 150-51.

130 "Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of
conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing
range." With respect to certain offenses, such as [the defendant's] drug conviction,
[the Sentencing Guidelines] require[ ] the sentencing court to consider "all acts and
omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan as the offense of conviction." Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
131 See id. at 149-51.

132 Id.at 157.
133 See id. at 151.

134 Id. at 149 (citation omitted).
135 Id.
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something completelf different in the era of enforceable guidelines.136 Making an argument which would need a few more
years maturing before garnering a majority on the Court, Justice
Stevens noted that while any information may be considered in
the exercise of discretion, the Sentencing Guidelines left only a
very narrow range of discretion in the decision of what sentence
to impose within the applicable range.1 37 In contrast, all of the
other judicial sentencing decisions determining the applicable
sentence did not deal with discretionary choices governed by the
principles of § 3661 and Williams .138 Those decisions are not left
to the judge's discretion, but are governed by enforceable law
and are much closer to the line drawn in Mullaney. Mullaney
will resurface in this debate to remind us that the substantive
criminal law, with all of its strong procedural protections, was
long concerned with not just whether a person was guilty of an
offense, but also being correct about what particular offense it
was, so that the correct degree of stigma and punishment would
attach.
The Court returned to this question, in a different dress, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,139 the last case in which a majority of the Court accepted the full force of McMillan.140
Almendarez-Torres involved a challenge to an illegal reentry
statute, which imposed a two-year maximum sentence on a person who reentered the country after deportation without special
permission, except that any person deported after conviction of
an aggravated felony was subject to a twenty-year mandatory
minimum.14 1 The defendant was charged with illegal reentry in
an indictment, which did not charge that the defendant had been
deported after conviction of an aggravated felony.1 42 The presentence report noted the defendant's eligibility for an enhanced
Id. at 159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 161-62.
138 See id.
139 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
140 The continued vitality of Almendarez-Torres is in doubt. The reach of the case
was narrowed by Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) (strictly limiting
the information judges may consider in determining whether a prior conviction is
sufficient to enhance a sentence). Justice Thomas has also observed that since he
announced he has changed his view and would overrule Almendarez-Torres, a majority of the Court no longer supports the rule. Id. at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
141 523 U.S. at 226 (reviewing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)).
142 See id. at 227.
136
137
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sentence. The defendant objected that the statutory maximum
was limited to two years because of the language of the indictment, the facts to which he admitted, and the omission of his
waiver of his right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the
fact of his previous conviction of an aggravated felony. 143 The
judge imposed a sentence of eighty-five months. 144 The defendant appealed and the Court affirmed the sentence. 4 5
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the defendant's
argument, finding that the aggravated felony requirement was a
sentencing factor, not an element. 146 The Court began its analysis by trying to determine Congress' intent, staying true to McMillan's central teaching that a legislature is free to define crimes
as it chooses within very broad constitutional limits. 1 47 After
close analysis of the statutory language, the Court concluded that
Congress intended the section to operate as a sentencing factor,
not an element.' 48 The Court then went on to consider whether
there was a constitutional infirmity in that choice.
The Court first considered whether Mullaney and Patterson
limited legislative power in this case, and the opinion emphasized
how weak the limiting principle of Mullaney had become when
the Court observed: "At most, petitioner might read all these
cases, taken together, for the broad proposition that sometimes
the Constitution does require (though sometimes it does not require) the State to treat a sentencing factor as an element. But
1' 49
we do not see how they can help petitioner more than that.'
The Court then considered McMillan, the case "upon which
petitioner must primarily rely."1 5 Applying the five-factor test
of McMillan, and emphasizing that recidivism is the classic sentencing factor, the Court noted that the statute at hand was just
like the statute in McMillan in four of the five dimensions discussed in the earlier case.' 5 ' As in McMillan, (1) there was no
express violation of the limits set out in Patterson, as the government did not enjoy a presumption of a long established and cen143 See
144 Id.
145
46

id.

Id. at 248.

147

Id. at 235.
See id. at 228-35.

148

Id. at 235.

1

14 9 Id. at 242.

150 Id.
151 Id. at 242-46.
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tral element of a common law crime; (2) the defendant did not
face a differential in sentencing ranging from a fine to life in
prison, as was the case with the Maine statute rejected in Mullaney; (3) the statute did not create a separate offense; and (4) the
statute gave no impression that it was intended to make the enhancement the tail that wagged the dog, but only gave precision
to a traditional sentencing factor.15 2
The high water mark of the strong uncoupling of liability from
severity and the strongest application of Williams to the changed
world of McMillan and legislative assertion of power comes in
the analysis of the fifth McMillan factor in Almendarez-Torrez,
as the Court stepped over the statutory maximum line, the last
clear limiting principle. The Court concluded that, although the
statute in this case did raise the maximum sentence specified by
the legislative enactment defining the crime, the Court had not
and would not adopt a bright line rule "that any significant increase in a statutory maximum sentence would trigger a constitutional 'elements' requirement."1 5' 3 The majority's treatment of
the statutory maximum in Almendarez-Torres marked the apogee of Patterson'slegislative discretion model. The analysis revolved around discerning legislative intent. The Court discussed
the idea of constitutional limitations on legislative power late, little, and lightly.
Perhaps those who can read tea leaves could see significance in
the fact that Justice Scalia authored a dissent arguing for a retreat from the Court's support for virtually unfettered legislative
discretion. Justice Scalia first argued that McMillan should be
read to set a real and substantial limit on legislative discretion,
requiring that facts resulting in a sentence above the statutory
maximum be treated as elements. 154 The dissent then went on to
critique the notion that recidivism is different from other sentencing factors and only then addressed the question of statutory
interpretation. 55 It would not be long before a majority of the
152 See id.
153 Id. at 247. The opinion went on to note that establishing a bright line rule
about the statutory maximum in light of the fact that a judge could constitutionally
make factual findings rendering a defendant eligible for a death sentence would be
an anomaly. Id. Of course, that rule would not survive the great shift that was
about to occur, as Apprendi was followed by Ring.
154 See id. at 256 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Importantly, Justice Scalia carefully distinguished mandatory minimums from maximums. Id. at 252-53.
155 Id. at 257-71.
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Court would be willing to impose real limitations upon legislative
discretion to define crimes, reasserting the role of the jury that
supports a broader reading of Mullaney and reopening space for
judicial discretion in the era of detailed legislative criminal
statutes.
VI
MULLANEY's REVENGE: JoNEs, APPRENDI, AND THE
REASSERTION OF LIMITATIONS
ON THE LEGISLATURE

Unless you stand far out on the mud flats at First Encounter
Beach on Cape Cod, it can be very hard to identify the moment
when the tide starts to run in again. And even when one can see
it running in, some of the tidal pools continue draining for a
while. Sometime between the Court's decision in Witte, when
the tide was running out fast against limits on legislative control
of criminal law, and Jones, when the tide was clearly running
back, there was a shift. Looking back, it seems that a bit of distance from the crack epidemic of the early 1990s and the real and
significant decrease in crime in America, coupled with a growing
sense that new policing and security approaches really worked,
combined to create space in public debate for examination of
questions such as the growing evidence of wrongful convictions
in the death penalty arena and the human and financial costs of
harsh mandatory sentencing. Few of us saw it as it happened, but
the one-way ratchet slowed, even if it did not reverse.
The significance of the next case in this line, Jones v. United
States,156 is obvious in hindsight. However, at the time, it seemed

to be just a small step back on the long march to legislative discretion to define crimes and set punishments with ever increasing
specificity. Jones involved a challenge to the federal carjacking
statute,157 which carried a maximum sentence of fifteen years in
the ordinary case, but permitted a sentence of up to twenty-five
years if there was a finding of serious bodily injury.'58 Jones was
tried on an indictment that did not plead serious bodily injury,
was convicted by a jury, and then sentenced to twenty-five years
after the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence
156 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
157 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000).

158 Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-30.
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the requisite enhancing fact of injury.159
This sentence could have been affirmed, perhaps per curiam,
with reliance on Witte, Watts, and Almendarez-Torrez, but it was

not. Justice Souter, now in the majority with the other Almendarez-Torres dissenters, Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Stevens, and joined here by Justice Thomas, turned first to the
question of legislative intent. Although the Court found that
mode of analysis sufficient to decide Almendarez-Torrez, here it
was inconclusive. 160 The majority expressed an inclination toward the view that Congress intended to define a separate crime
and so made serious bodily injury an element, rather than a sentencing factor.1 6 ' But the Court recognized "the possibility of

the other view," and in the face of that uncertainty, read the statute to avoid declaring it unconstitutional.162 Although the Court
might have stopped there and treated Almendarez-Torres and
Jones as only a pair of constitutional doubt cases, presenting a
less ambiguous statute in Almendarez-Torres and a more ambiguous but still constitutional statute in Jones, it did not. 163 This
apparent deference to the legislature set up the larger constitutional question of what limits the Court would impose as the majority went on to breathe new life into Mullaney.
Taking a strikingly different analytic tack from the mid-1990s
cases discussed above, the Jones opinion discussed the fundamental division of authority between judge and jury under the
Sixth Amendment, revived the McMillan formulation of the statutory maximum as the limit above which a mere sentencing factor may not further enhance a sentence, and clearly limited
Almendarez- Torres to cases in which recidivism is the enhancing
factor. 6 4 The holding that the carjacking statute created three
separate crimes and that serious bodily injury must be pled and
proven to the jury165 proved the turning point in the Supreme
Court's contemporary sentencing cases.
As is so often the case as the Court takes incremental steps,
the complicated relationships among the boundaries of legislative power, judicial power, prosecutorial power, and the role of
at 230-31.
160 See id. at 233.
161 Id. at 229.
162 Id. at 239-40, 251.
163 See id. at 248-49.
164 See id. at 251-52.
159 Id.

165 Id.
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the jury are only partially explored in Jones. The analysis of the
jury's historical role and the explicit focus on balance between
judge and jury marked an important shift in analysis - away
from statutory construction and discussions of legislative intent
and toward the constitutional limits on legislative discretion.
That shift in analysis would become more pronounced in Apprendi v. New Jersey 166 and Blakely v. Washington.167 What remained unstated in Jones, but surfaced quite clearly in Blakely,
was discussion of the twenty-year shift from indeterminate sentencing to detailed sentencing statutes and guidelines. In a system dominated by guilty pleas, the apparent doctrinal shift of
authority from judge to jury (expanding the range of elements
and so apparently diminishing the judicial role), was really a shift
in power back to judges and away from a twenty-year rise in legislative and prosecutorial power to set punishment.
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Jones gestured in the direction of
the systemic impact and potential disruption to which the underlying reasoning of Jones could, and eventually did, lead. First
analyzing the statutory language for evidence of congressional intent, the dissent argued that the statute creates only a sentencing
factor. 168 The dissent then argued that Almendarez-Torres
should have been understood as reaching more broadly and cementing the broad view of legislative discretion to define
crimes."' Raising the flag of formalism first flown in this debate
by Justice Powell in his dissent in Patterson, Justice Kennedy
noted that the majority would have had Congress simply raise
the statutory maximum to life, changing a few words to get the
170
same result.
In many respects, Jones left us back in the world of Mullaney
and Patterson. After Patterson, it seemed there were some limits
to legislative authority to define crimes. It appeared that those
powers were broad, but the contours of the discretion were uncertain. McMillan gave us broad discretion, seemingly limited by
the statutory maximum in the legislative enactment defining the
crime. Then Almendarez-Torres suggested that even the statutory maximum was not a clear limit. These were the doctrinal
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
168 Jones, 526 U.S. at 256 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169 See id. at 266-71.
170 Id. at 267.
166
167
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underpinnings of detailed statutory sentencing provisions and enforceable guidelines.
Jones signaled a change in direction, but left open the real possibility that the Court would continue to set very broad limits and
might leave much of contemporary sentencing undisturbed. The
Court was willing to impose some limits on legislative discretion
to define crimes and sentences, although like Mullaney, the first
case to set limits, its reach was unclear. It seemed possible that
Jones would have its Patterson, a follow up case that would limit
Jones to its very particular setting and reaffirm the late twentieth-century sentencing world of Williams-style minimalist procedural requirements in the era of enforceable Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Instead, we got Apprendi.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens positioned Apprendi
as flowing from and foreshadowed by Jones. 7 ' Apprendi involved the New Jersey assault statute that carried a ten-year statutory maximum, but permitted a sentence of up to twenty years
if the assault was racially motivated.' 7 2 The judge sentenced the
defendant to twelve years, although the finding of racial bias was
made by the judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard. 7 3 The Court offered an extended historically based discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and emphasized
the special role statutory maxima play in our system. 1 74 The
opinion then set out a rule that did not use the language "statutory maximum," but the broader phrase "prescribed range of
penalties." The Court told us, with the prior offense exception:
[W]e endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions [of Jones]. "It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts
75 must
be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The battle lines had now shifted. The question was no longer
whether statutory maxima offered a bright line rule, but whether
171 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. Apprendi also flowed from Justice Stevens' dissents in McMillan, Witte, and Watts, and the clear echoes of those dissents in Justice
Scalia's dissent in Almendarez-Torres.
172 Id. at 468-69 (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 2000)).
173 Id. at 471.
174 Id. at 476-83.
175 Id. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53).
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other kinds of limits, most notably guidelines, fell within the ambit of "the prescribed range of penalties."
Justice O'Connor's dissent took on the historical analysis of
the majority and argued that the rule announced in Apprendi
effectively overrules McMillan, without admitting that it did so
or justifying the departure from stare decisis. 17 6 Although one
may quibble with the characterization that McMillan was overruled, no doubt exists that Apprendi was profoundly unsympathetic to the McMillan approach, which eschewed bright line
rules in this area and supported broad legislative discretion to
define crimes and punishment. Justice Breyer made the point
more plainly in his dissent, arguing that Apprendi upset the settled understanding on the division of sentencing authority and
cast grave doubt on modern sentencing.1 77 His dissent also asked
whether juries can engage in the detailed fact-finding required by
enforceable guidelines, which raised questions about two parts of
the triangular relationship among juries, judges, and legislatures
(and those legislative surrogates, in this context, the

prosecutors). 178
VII
ONE STEP BACK AND THE FINAL LEAP FORWARD:
HARRIS, BLAKELY AND BOOKER

Although Apprendi was clearly a very significant case, it was
followed by an opinion that could have limited it, as Patterson
limited Mullaney. Harris v. United States posed a challenge to
the mandatory sentencing provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which
imposed a minimum seven-year term upon anyone convicted of a
crime of violence or narcotics trafficking who brandishes a
weapon during the commission of that offense. 17 9 The defendant
in Harris argued that the statute created a separate crime which
was not submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and thus violated Jones.18 The defendant also argued
that the statute increased the prescribed range of penalties and
violated Apprendi.' 8
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 524-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 557.
536 U.S. 545, 550 (2002).
Id. at 551.
See id.
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The majority, made up of the Jones dissenters and Justice
Scalia, breathed new life into McMillan, which also involved a
mandatory minimum sentence for use of a gun in the commission
of another crime. In a decision that may be read as carefully
distinguishing the precedents and applying stare decisis, or as using a bit of formalism to revive the letter if not the spirit of a
discredited case, the Court ruled that § 924(c) was a sentencing
factor under McMillan, not an element under Apprendi.182 The

doctrinal key to Harris is the distinction between juries finding
facts that set the maximum penalty, and judges finding facts that
establish the bottom of a sentencing range.
Justice Thomas, in dissent and joined by the remaining three of
the Jones majority, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that the logic and language of Apprendi cannot and should
not be squared with McMillan.183 He relied, with some justifica-

tion, on the argument that the language, "facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties," embraces mandatory minimums,
as well as the maximum, because a range of five years to life is, in
common understanding, an increase in the range of penalties
over a range of zero years to life.184 Justice Thomas noted that
"before today, no one seriously believed that the Court's earlier
decision in McMillan could coexist with the logical implications
'
But
of the Court's later decisions in Apprendi and Jones."185

Harris revived the possibility that legislative discretion to define
crimes and to allocate and limit judicial sentencing authority, sufficient to sustain most enforceable guidelines systems, could
survive.
After Harris,it seemed possible that the Court would walk the
line, requiring that statutory maximum altering facts go to juries,
and all, or some subset of other enhancing facts, could remain
with the judge. But Blakely v. Washington 186 erased many of
those questions.
Famously, at least within the world of sentencing law, Blakely
brought the top of the range in enforceable sentencing guidelines
systems within the ambit of Jones and Apprendi. Once the door
closed on the meaning and scope of the phrase "facts that inId. at 556-57.
Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184 See id. at 577-82.
185 Id. at 582.
186 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
182
183
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crease the prescribed range of penalties," the major hope to save
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was the argument that they
were not statutes, but some other form of law that did not fall
within the rule first promulgated by Mullaney. But that argument did not garner five votes on the Supreme Court. United
States v. Booker'8 7 followed directly from Blakely and, by that

point, the interesting and hard questions were remedial, not
doctrinal.
CONCLUSION

The road from Mullaney to Booker took us far into the land of
unlimited legislative discretion and back. It started in an era
characterized by fewer and less specific criminal statutes which
relied upon judicial discretion and indeterminate sentencing to
apply those broader rules to the vast array of cases that came
before the courts. Procedural protections mattered less in that
system because sentences turned on individual judgments, not
the application of rules. The system had little need to examine
the limits of legislative power, as legislatures were not inclined to
approach, let alone push upon the limits they had long observed.
By the late 1980s, the whole interdependent system began to
shift dramatically. As legislators began to define crimes and set
punishments with ever greater specificity, sentencing procedures
began to matter a great deal, and the bounds of legislative and
judicial power became contested. Although the doctrinal questions played out in the right to a jury trial, our reliance upon
guilty pleas has turned jury power into judicial power, at least
temporarily. The politicization of criminal justice in the 1980s
and the strong assertion of legislative dominance in criminal justice that developed in response to that politicization were the underlying forces that pushed these issues forward. In what may be
a healthy exercise in correcting power imbalances among the
branches of our government, the Court circled back around to
renewed concern with the limits of legislative power as the issues
took on a very different cast in the world of mandatory minimums and enforceable guidelines.
At each turn in the direction of the Court's limit setting on
legislative discretion, Patterson, and Jones, the dissent argued
that either the majority's failure to limit legislative authority or
187

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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the majority's excessive limitation upon legislative authority is a
retreat into mere formalism - the legislature can always find a
way to write the statute to achieve its desired result within the
bounds of the Court's requirement. This captures the current reality. Whether we think about "topless guidelines" or a system
of very lengthy and detailed statutes setting out a wide array of
mandatory sentences for very specific offenses, drafting alternatives exist to return us to much of pre-Booker sentencing in the
post-Booker world.
Predictions about the future of criminal sentencing in America
have lately been frequent, and frequently wrong. As a theoretical matter, there is great appeal in the call for the Supreme Court
to engage in more regulation of the substantive criminal law. As
William Stuntz has argued, the Court could construct a system of
procedural limits with real bite on substantive criminal statutes,
creating an updated version of common law court lawmaking and
couple it with revived judicial sentencing authority. 188 This
would insulate our criminal law from the danger of politicization
of criminal justice, which I have argued is at the root of the
stresses and excesses of the last twenty years.
Short of that major change, perhaps we must recognize that
there is likely to be a degree of formalism in any solution the
Court offers to these problems. In our system of multiple criminal law codes and coordinate branches of government, it may
well be impossible to find a substantive solution that will provide
stable lines defining the reach of each branch, especially assuming each branch continues to push on the line. Perhaps Justice
Stevens was right to look to self-limiting principles in the long
term politics of criminal law. In his analysis of the difference between aggravating and mitigating factors, he noted the natural
limits on turning elements into mitigating factors - at some
point too much innocent conduct is swept in and people are unwilling to have many defendants forced to prove their innocence.
But aggravators are different, as their harm is limited to an
already despised class, convicted criminals. While Justice Stevens is right, and the Court must step in to protect the rights of
defendants, it may also be true that even aggravating factors have
188 See Stuntz, supra note 3 (suggesting constitutional regulation of the substantive criminal law as one way to escape the problems of over-criminalization and
excessive prosecutorial power brought on by the politicization of American criminal
justice policy).
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an upper political limit. At some point, the creation of too many
aggravating factors creates a substantive injustice clear enough to
merit public attention. The continued development of enhanced
and mandatory penalties has become a clear cause of injustice in
America as the public learns of more and more sentences that
simply do not fit the crime.
The history of this period is still to be lived and written. But if
it turns out that the tide of sentence severity and politicization of
criminal justice has turned, then we will have reached the political limits of enhancing sentences through legislative domination
of our criminal law. That would offer the best hope of a more
workable and stable long term solution. If each branch in our
system would stop trying to expand its power by pressing aggressively on the edges of the law, the fundamental limits of the doctrines would not matter as much. We would stop running up
against the limits of the law. After all, the law itself cannot make
us good, it can only help us to be good if we are so inclined.

